Teen Forums - Teen Chat, Teen Help, Teen Advice & Support

Jam · 05-12-11, 02:43 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cookie

So the very definition of morality is subjective?

I do not disagree with you that it is nonsensical to label things as "good/right" or 'bad/wrong". quite the opposite. Most theologists attempt to argue that there is a "need" for an objective morality that exists outside of personal opinion. But, is it sensible to argue the necessity of it if it does not exist/ is beyond our ability to practice/understand?

Definitions are necessarily subjective, my friend.

The short answer is no: if objective morality does not exist, then there is no practical purpose that can be served by discussing it. Unfortunately, I'm pretty sure the question of morality is one which would require Richard Dawkins' PAP (permanent agnosticism in principle): how can we possible ever falsify a claim about the objective or subjective nature of morality? I think it is fair to discuss the implications of possibilites, even if we have no way of knowing for sure that these possibilites are reality.

Maybe there is a human "need" for objective morality, but that is simply irrelevant to the question of whether or not it exists.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cookie

For the sake of the topic at hand, an objective morality would imply "evil" or amorality exists. Problem of evil - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia [en.wikipedia.org] [en.wikipedia.org] [en.wikipedia.org]

Any type of morality would imply the existenceof immorality (or at least the possibility thereof). I was under the impression that amorality was a lack of morality or immorality; not the opposite of morality. For example, a non-sentient object without the capacity to think would be labelled amoral.

Anyway, is immorality of sentient beings truly "evil" if the omnibenevolent Creator of said beings intended for them to act immorally?

Anyway, here is a short essay I once wrote on the problem of evil:

Quote:

Before beginning, it is probably necessary to explain what exactly the Epicurean Paradox is. It is not strictly a paradox – just a small piece of writing that aims to illustrate the potentially paradoxical nature of a god. Its exact origin is unknown, but it is generally credited to a Greek philosopher named Epicurus. Although no Epicurean writings mention the “paradox”, the earliest consideration of this version of the Problem of Evil was referenced in another text as coming from Epicurus, and so he is generally assumed to be its source1. This is the most common form:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both willing and able? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”2

In more standard form, the general argument derived from this can be expressed in the following manner:
- The existence of evil and the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being are mutually exclusive.
- Evil exists.
- Therefore an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being cannot exist.

As most modern-day religious people believe God to be all-powerful and perfectly good, this is often considered a suitable argument to refute their faith. However, the “original” problem also questions the origins of evil and the minimum characteristics necessary for a being to be classified as a god. In a way, some parts of this paradox can be considered little more than appeals to ignorance: “we do not know the answers to these questions, and therefore there are none.”

Now, before dealing with the logical consequences of an infinitely powerful and good being, we should first consider whether or not this is actually necessary. Although popular Christian doctrine claims that God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc., this is not necessarily scripturally accurate. Nowhere in the Bible (Old or New Testament) is it stated outright that God is omni-anything.3 With respect to omnibenevolence, there are indeed many examples in the Bible of God actually hating particular individuals.4* So, even if Epicurus’ problem were to be a proof for the impossibility of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, it would not disprove the existence of God – just some of his alleged characteristics. This would not really be a huge criticism – we are not now suggesting that God is weak or evil; simply that he is not infinitely powerful and good. If this were true, God could still have incredible power and being amazingly good, but we would just have to place a limit of some kind on these characteristics. For example, although 9 x 10^999999999999 is not infinity, it is still a ridiculously large number. In the same way, God’s power can be hugely vast without being infinite.

In response to Epicurus’ suggestion that the lack of these infinite characteristics prevents a supreme being from being God, we can simply refer back to this point about the difference between incredible power and infinite power, and point out that many religions (particularly those of old – Ancient Greece and Egypt, for example) feature gods that are nowhere near all-powerful, all-knowing or “good”.5

Let us now go back to considering the idea of an omnipotent being. The trouble that often arises in these discussions is that people tend to neglect to define omnipotence: can an omnipotent being do anything that is physically possible, anything that is logically possible, or absolutely anything whatsoever – even if it defies logic (is self-contradictory, for example- such as creating a square circle or dark light)? If we begin by limiting omnipotence to anything logically possible, then explaining the presence of evil in the world using free will no longer falls apart as an argument. Evil may be a necessary logical consequence of free will and, as God is bound by logic, He cannot simply dispel evil without also removing free will. Put simply, much evil is the result of people choosing to do “bad” things; if God were to prevent this, He would be removing free will.

It can, of course, be argued that this only explains evil caused by humans, and not suffering caused by things such as natural disasters. However, this is not necessarily the case. Some religious believers argue that angels as well as humans have free will, and that angels also have a certain amount of “power”.6 This may seem ridiculous, and the scriptural evidence supporting this fairly limited, but it is still a possibility. If a renegade angel (e.g. “Satan”) chooses to cause human suffering through things such as disease and natural disaster, then God might have to remove its free will to prevent this from happening.

These arguments from free will are special cases of the argument that evil has a purpose in the world and contributes toward some kind of “greater good”. These are, of course, only valid if God is not omnipotent without the bounds of logic – if he were, then God could achieve this greater good and simply remove these “necessary” evils. However, the whole idea of a “greater good” is not necessarily compatible with a biblical view of morality. People are expected to obey God’s commandments regardless of whether or not breaking them would appear to serve a higher purpose7 i.e. morality is implied to be about actions themselves, rather than about their consequences. Hence, some believers may reject this explanation. They could be mistaken, though, as it may not be wise to generalise from the way in which we interpret morality to the way in which God does. It could be that we are expected to obey the commandments in all cases simply because we are not wise or knowledgeable enough to know what will and what will not serve the greater good – in most cases, obeying the commandments will lead to the greater good. It is better to obey them at all times, even when this may be counterproductive, than to allow all people to determine for themselves what will and will not serve this greater good. Being omniscient (or possibly just incredibly knowledgeable), God has the ability to know what is and what is not serving the greater good i.e. sometimes consequences may justify actions, and God knows when this is the case. We do not.

Let us now return to the idea of a totally omnipotent god – one who can do things that are self-contradictory and defy logic. If this is the case, then it could be argued that the whole Problem of Evil disappears: it may be a logical impossibility for an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being to coexist with evil, but that’s no problem for God! As the author of logic, He can bend it, twist it and totally change it on a whim. I am aware that many will very much dislike this idea, as it simply seems like a get-out clause for a theist to use whenever they feel that they are wrong. This may be how it is often used but, without a logical refutation, the point that God may be able to defy logic still stands: He is, after all, supposed to be largely transcendent.

Finally, we should consider the very nature of evil itself. We know that humanity is fallible, and we know that not all share the same ideas of morality. If there were one thing that would make the entire problem of evil fall apart entirely, it would be if were to discover that evil does not exist. Even if it then turned out that God and evil were mutually exclusive, God could still exist. Now, this may sound totally absurd, but we have to remember that our ideas of what is right could be totally incorrect, and we have no real way of “measuring” morality: we do not even know if it is objective. It could, therefore, be possible that God is perfectly good, and that everything that happens is itself good, regardless of whether or not it seems good to us. This idea would not seem to agree with common sense – but common sense proves incorrect and useless so often that this is not really a valid criticism. Of course, if true, this would introduce some striking real-life consequences...

It should also be noted that the existence of evil/suffering may be a logical necessity for the existence of goodness/happiness in the world. Happiness and fulfilment are totally subjective and relative experiences, and if one were to somehow remove all suffering, this would not necessarily cause everyone to be happy. Rather, people would just be at different stages of happiness. Instead of suffering, individuals would simply not be happy. This would, however, lead to unhappiness becoming the “new” suffering. This can be illustrated by thinking of a scale of happiness from very sad to very happy, with “unhappy” representing neutrality. If we were to simply remove the lower half of the scale, making it now go from unhappy to very happy, relative happiness would still be spread out in an identical fashion, but with those who were very sad now being “unhappy”. If, however, they had spent their entire life in this new scale, then they would still be feeling exactly the same now, relative to their past experiences of happiness, as when using the “old system”. Essentially, we determine how happy we are by working out how much we deviate from our normal/average happiness. If evil were removed, then normal/average happiness would also be much higher, and the “distance” by which we deviate would not actually change. People could then reinvent the Epicurean paradox, with apathy or neutrality replacing evil, and the whole process could be repeated again, ad infinitum, never actually achieving the real increase in happiness/decrease in evil desired.

In conclusion, the Problem of Evil does not constitute proof that a god does not exist. It simply highlights the potential theological difficulties with theistic belief and narrows down the possibilities for the way in which a god can be reasonably conceived to exist. While not all of the aforementioned solutions can be simultaneously true, it has been shown that there are a number of ways that it is possible for the Abrahamic God specifically to exist. It should also be noted that this refutation is in no way an argument for the existence of a god: the refutation of an argument against a hypothesis is not an argument for said hypothesis.

Bibliography

1Mark Joseph Larrimore, (2001), The Problem of Evil
2David Hume, (1776), Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
3[Many verses in the Bible are commonly cited as suggesting God’s omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence etc., but none are unquestionable. One could write an entire essay or whether or not it is scripturally accurate to attribute to God these qualities, and so I have decided not to include any direct references. I would strongly urge anyone who believes that these qualities are irrefutable to review the ambiguity in their biblical evidence, particularly when examined across a range of different translations.]
4The Bible: Psalm 5:5; Psalm 11:5; Proverbs 6:16-19; Hosea 9:15; Malachi 1:3 [Not a comprehensive list of quotations.]
*It may be important to note that many theologians do not see God’s hatred as compromising his omnibenevolence; only unrighteous hatred is seen as immoral.
5 http://www.greek-gods.info; Robert Graves et al, (1987), New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology; Richard Wilkinson, (2003), The Complete Gods and Goddesses of Ancient Egypt
6 http://www.religionfacts.com/christi...fs/angels.htm; http://carm.org/questions/about-doct...hat-are-angels
7The Bible: Matthew 5:19; Romans 2:13; Deuteronomy 5:32 [Not a comprehensive list of quotations.]

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cookie

"EXO 15:3 The LORD is a man of war: the LORD is his name.

God is often portrayed as a warrior in scripture. For example, the name of God popularly translated as "the LORD Almighty" is more accurately rendered "the LORD of Hosts" or "the LORD of Armies".

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cookie

ROM 15:33 Now the God of peace be with you all. Amen."

God is sovereign: He is lord of all. He is the God of peace and the God of war, the Alpha and the Omega etc. etc.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cookie

"PSA 145:9 The LORD is good to all: and his tender mercies are over all his works.

I think this verse is better understood as "the LORD is just to all". "Good" is far too ambiguous for this context. Although I'm not sure if you were suggesting that it is not, I would argue that it is perfectly possible to reconcile God's goodness - or His justice - with examples of His hate and punishment. If people sin and deserve punishment, then it is perfectly just for God to hate and punish them.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cookie

JER 13:14 And I will dash them one against another, even the fathers and the sons together, saith the LORD: I will not pity, nor spare, nor have mercy, but destroy them."

If these people have sinned greatly and deserve punishment, and God knows that they will not repent and ask forgiveness, then how is He unjust for destroying them?

Quote:

Originally Posted by Cookie

One can argue that he is being benevolent in Jeremiah 13:14, by being a keeper of order, but is he still benevolent even when he does the opposite? If morality isn't subjective for even god, then can he truly be benevolent in all circumstances?

Here's a question I'd like to ask you: if God created morality Himself, is it sensical to ask whether He is moral? Perhaps amoral would be an appropriate term to attribute to God in some respects...